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The First Amendment and Speech Urging
Suicide: Lessons from the Case of
Michelle Carter and the Need to Expand
Brandenburg's Application
Clay Calvert*
This Article examines the level ofFirstAmendmentprotectionthat appliesto a defendantspeaker when chargedwith involuntarymanslaughterbasedon successfully urging aperson to
commit suicide. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Courth February 2019 decision in
Commonwealth v. Carter provides a timely analytical springboard This Article argues that
courts shouldadopt the UnitedStates Supreme Court s testfor incitementcreateda half-century
ago in Brandenburg v. Ohio before such speech is deemed unprotectedby the FirstAmendment.
It contends this standardis appropriateeven in involuntary manslaughtercases where intent to
cause a specific result is not required under criminal law. This Article concludes that the
Brandenburg test, which embraces a specific intent element, strikes a better balance between
FirstAmendmentinterests andcriminallaw than does the elastic "integralto criminalconduct"
standardfrom Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co. that the court applied in Commonwealth
v. Carter. Ultimately, although Brandenburg might not have saved Michelle Carterfrom
conviction hadit been used, it couldprotectfuture defendants where demonstratingintent seems
less clear-cut.
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INTRODUCTION

In February 2019, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in
Commonwealth v. Carter' affirmed Michelle Carter's conviction for
involuntary manslaughter 2 as a youthful offender based on her urging
Conrad Roy to commit suicide.' In doing so, the court rejected Carter's
claim that her conviction violated her First Amendment' right of free
speech. Specifically, it reasoned that Carter's words with Roy
immediately before and while he died were "integral to a course of
6
criminal conduct and thus [did] not raise any constitutional problem."
In brief, Massachusetts's high court concluded that Carter's
speech caused Roy's death' and that the First Amendment provided her
no refuge.' Its First Amendment analysis comprises the focus of this
Article, which questions whether the court applied a constitutional
standard that gave short shrift to free speech concerns.
Before reaching that issue, however, it helps to understand key
details about Carter. The case garnered massive attention across the

1.

Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559 (Mass. 2019).

2.

In Massachusetts, "[i]nvoluntary manslaughter is an unintentional, unlawful killing

caused by wanton or reckless conduct." Commonwealth v. Earle, 937 N.E.2d 42, 48 (Mass.
2010). See infra Part II.A (providing an overview of involuntary manslaughter
Massachusetts).

in

3.

Carter, 115 N.E.3d at 562.

4.

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, that

"Congress shall make no law . .

abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST.

amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses, incorporated nearly ninety-five years ago
through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties, apply to state

and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925)

("[F]reedom of speech and of the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from
abridgment by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.").
Carter, in fact, was "in voice contact while the suicide was in progress ... [and]
5.
was able to communicate with the victim, hear what was going on in the truck, and give him
instructions." Carter, 115 N.E.3d at 567.

6.

Id. at 572.

7.

See id. at 574 ("The evidence against the defendant proved that, by her wanton or

reckless conduct, she caused the victim's death by suicide.").
See id at 571-72 ("[T]here is nothing in the prosecution or conviction of the
8.
defendant in the instant case, or the prior involuntary manslaughter cases in the Commonwealth
involving verbal criminal conduct, to suggest that the First Amendment has been violated in
any way.").
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nation,' inspiring an HBO documentary called ILove You, Now Die.o
It was likely the sensational, troubling facts surrounding the case, as
well as what one newspaper aptly called its "implications for future
cases about free speech and assisted suicide," that piqued such media
interest."
In particular, Michelle Carter was seventeen years old when
Conrad Roy, who was eighteen and in "fragile mental health," 2 killed
himself in July 2014 by inhaling carbon monoxide in his pickup truck
in Fairhaven, Massachusetts.1 3 The pair had maintained a long-distance
relationship by texting and phone calls since meeting in 2012, although
they rarely saw each other in person.1 4 Prior to the day Roy died, Carter
had encouraged him to commit suicide, even making him promise to
do so." Roy, in fact, tried unsuccessfully several times.16

9.
See, e.g, Marco della Cava, Suicide by Text: Verdict Walks a Fine Line, USA
TODAY, June 19,2017, at lA; Barbara Demick, Woman Guilty inFriend'sSuicide, L.A. TIMES,
June 17, 2017, at A5; Alanna Durkin Richer, Conviction Upheld for Woman Who Urged
Boyfriend's Suicide, ST. LoUIs POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 7,2019, at A15; Katharine Q. Seelye, For
Urging a Suicide, 15 Months in Jail, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 4, 2017, at Al0; Katharine Q. Seelye
& Jess Bidgood, Young Woman Who UrgedFriendto Commit Suicide Is FoundGuilty, N.Y.
TIviES, June 17, 2017, at All; Marie Szaniszlo & Laurel J. Sweet, Time's upfor Carteras Jail
Time Begins, Bos. HERALD, Feb. 12, 2019, at 5A.
10.
See generally Olivia Armstrong, What to Know About 'I Love You, Now Die'
Before It Premieres, HBO, https://www.hbo.com/documentaries/i-love-you-now-die-thecommonwealth-v-michelle-carter/sxsw-premiere-erin-lee-carr (last visited Oct. 24, 2019)
(discussing the documentary before its premiere).
11.
Barbara Demick, Is Urging One to Suicide Tantamount to Killing?, L.A. TIMEs,
June 16, 2017, at A6.

12.

Carter, 115 N.E.3d at 562.

13.

Id at 561-62; Demick, supra note 11.

14.

Carter, 115 N.E.3d at 562.

15.

As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court encapsulated Carter's earlier efforts

to help Roy take his own life, she had:
helped plan how, where, and when he would do so, and downplayed his fears about

how his suicide would affect his family. She also repeatedly chastised him for his
indecision and delay, texting, for example, that he "better not be bull shiting me and
saying you're gonna do this and then purposely get caught" and made him "promise"

to kill himself
Id at 563 (footnotes omitted).

16.

See id. at 562 ("Between October 2012 and July 2014, the victim attempted suicide

several times by various means, including overdosing on over-the-counter medication,
drowning, water poisoning, and suffocation. None of these attempts succeeded, as the victim
abandoned each attempt or sought rescue.").
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Critical to Carter's conviction were two phone conversations she
had with Roy immediately before and during his successful suicide on
July 12, 2014.17 At one point, while trying to kill himself that day, Roy
left his truck and aborted his effort." It was what happened next that
essentially sealed Michelle Carter's legal fate. Although no
19
contemporaneous record exists of what was said during those calls,
Carter later texted a friend stating that Roy's
death is my fault like honestly I could have stopped him I was on the
phone with him and he got out of the carbecause it was working and he
got scared and Ifucking told him to get back in ... because I knew he

live the
would do it all over again the next day and I couldn't have him
20
him.
let
wouldn't
I
it
do
I
couldn't
anymore
living
was
way he
All of this led the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to
conclude that Bristol County Juvenile Court Judge Lawrence Moniz,
who presided over Carter's bench trial,2 ' reasonably could have found
that Roy "was badgered back into the gas-infused truck by the
defendant"2 2 and that Carter "did absolutely nothing to help him: she
did not call for help or tell him to get out of the truck as she listened to
him choke and die."23 Colloquially put, Carter's words were weapons
that caused Roy to die in his truck, while her silence once he returned
there was a fatal sin of omission.
The First Amendment, of course, does not protect all categories
of expression.2 4 But significantly-and of key concern for this
Article-the Bay State's highest court failed to apply the test for

17. See id at 565 ("Cell phone records showed that one call of over forty minutes had
been placed by the victim to the defendant, and a second call of similar length by the defendant
to the victim, during the time when police believe the victim was in his truck committing
suicide.").
See id ("The judge found that the victim got out of the truck, seeking fresh air, in
18.
a way similar to how he had abandoned his prior suicide attempts.").
Id
19.
20. Id (emphasis added).
21. See Seelye, supra note 9, at AlO (noting that Judge Lawrence Moniz of Bristol
County Juvenile Court found Carter "guilty of involuntary manslaughter during the nonjury
trial" in June 2017).
Carter, 115 N.E.3d at 568.
22.
23. Id at 568-69.
See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245-46 (2002) ("As a general
24.
principle, the First Amendment bars the government from dictating what we see or read or
speak or hear. The freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of
speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real
children." (emphasis added)).
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incitement to unlawful action25 developed by the United States
Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio26 to determine if Michelle
Carter's speech urging suicide fell outside the scope of constitutional
protection. Brandenburgsupplies the "current general test for advocacy
of lawless action."27 Instead, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
ruled Carter's speech was unprotected because it was "integral to a
course of criminal conduct." 28 As with incitement, this is another
variety of expression that the U.S. Supreme Court deems beyond the
ambit of First Amendment shelter.29
This latter categorical carve-out dates back seventy years to the
Court's 1949 ruling in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.30 In
Giboney, the Court held that "it has never been deemed an abridgment
of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal
merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried
out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed." 3 1
Yet, as Professor Eugene Volokh recently pointed out, this rule is
"little-defined"32 and "courts need to explain and cabin its scope."3 3
25.
Suicide, although not a statutory crime in Massachusetts, conflicts with a statutory
provision in that state. Specifically, Massachusetts law does not "permit any affirmative or
deliberate act to end one's own life other than to permit the naturalprocess of dying." MAss.
GEN. LAWS ch. 201D, § 12 (2019) (emphasis added). Under this statute, Massachusetts is
"implicitly declaring that suicide is illegal." Katherine Ann Wingfield & Carl S. Hacker,
Physician-AssistedSuicide: An Assessment and Comparisonof StatutoryApproaches Among
the States, 32 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 13, 57 (2007). Historically, however, suicide was a

common law crime in the Bay State. See Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 425 (1877)
("The life of every human being is under the protection of the law, and cannot be lawfully taken
by himself or by another with his consent, except by legal authority." (emphasis added)).
26.
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
27.
S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., Recalibratingthe Cost
of Harm Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1192
(2000).
28. Carter, 115 N.E.3d at 572.
29.
See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (identifyring "speech
integral to criminal conduct" as among the categories of expression not protected by the First
Amendment); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (listing "speech integral to
criminal conduct" as a category of unprotected speech).
30.
336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949). In Giboney, the Court rejected the contention that "the
constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as
an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute." Id. at 498. The Court added
that "it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course
of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out
by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed." Id at 502.
31. Id
32.
Eugene Volokh, The "Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct" Exception, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 981, 983 (2016).
33. 1d at 984.
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Similarly, Professor Michal Buchhandler-Raphael notes that while the
U.S. Supreme Court has recently listed the integral-to-criminalconduct exception among the varieties of unprotected speech, it has
34
failed to articulate "guidelines on the scope of the exception." In brief,
it is highly problematic to apply such a nebulous standard when a
person's freedom from incarceration lies in the balance.
Furthermore, the speech at issue in Giboney had nothing to do
with an individual urging another person to commit a specific act like
killing himself." Rather, the expression in Giboney constituted
36
picketing by a labor union at a company's place of business. The
picketing, in turn, was part of a larger plan by the union to force the
business to violate a state antitrust statute. Such speech is, factually,
far removed from one teen urging another to kill himself.
Yet, for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Carter was
not a Brandenburgcase about speech urging someone to commit an
unlawful act imminently. Rather, it was a case about the words
themselves, much like bullets shot from a gun, causing the crime of
involuntary manslaughter and, therefore, under Giboney, not insulated
by the First Amendment.
This Article examines whether this analysis by Massachusetts's
highest court is correct. Part II initially provides an overview of the
crime of involuntary manslaughter in Massachusetts and then briefly
describes the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's analysis of the
wanton-or-reckless conduct facet of that crime in Commonwealth v.
38
Furthermore, Part II reviews the U.S. Supreme Court's
Carter.
incitement standard from Brandenburg and contends that it should
apply to cases such as Carterwhere, although the underlying act of
suicide itself may be lawful,39 a defendant's words become their very
own crime for supposedly causing it. Next, Part III argues that the
Brandenburgtest should have applied in Carter,particularly in light of
40
Brandenburg'sintent requirement. Finally, this Article concludes in
Part IV by suggesting that although the Brandenburgtest might not
Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Overcriminalizing Speech, 36 CARDoZO L. REV.
34.
1667, 1708-09 (2015).
35. See Giboney, 336 U.S. at 491-92.
36. Id at 497-500.
37. Id at 501-04.
See infra notes 42-84 and accompanying text.
38.
See Penney Lewis, Rights DiscourseandAssistedSuicide, 27 Am. J.L. & MED. 45,
39.
59 n.76 (2001) ("Suicide is no longer a crime in any American state.").
40. Infra notes 85-106 and accompanying text.
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have saved Michelle Carter from conviction, it may help other
defendants where the question of intent is seemingly more
speculative.4 1
II.

INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER AND BRANDENBURG:
JUXTAPOSITION OF INTENT REQUIREMENTS

A

This Part has two subparts. Subpart A provides a primer on the
crime of involuntary manslaughter in Massachusetts. Subpart B then
offers an overview of the U.S. Supreme Court's incitement doctrine as
defined in its fifty-year-old Brandenburgv. Ohio ruling. Subpart B also
argues that Brandenburgshould extend to cases where, although the
underlying act (suicide, in Carter) is lawful itself, the words that
successfully urge it to completion become their own crime.
A.

Involuntary Manslaughterin Massachusetts

Involuntary manslaughter, like murder, is a type of homicide.4 2 A
key distinction between murder and manslaughter, however, is that the
latter only arises in the absence of malice.43 Massachusetts defines
involuntary manslaughter under its common law, rather than by
statute." Specifically, "[i]nvoluntary manslaughter is an unlawful
homicide unintentionally caused by an act which constitutes such a
disregard of probable harmful consequences to another as to amount to
wanton or reckless conduct."' More succinctly, involuntary
manslaughter is "an unintentional, unlawful killing caused by wanton
or reckless conduct."4 6 What does this mean?
First, "[w]anton or reckless conduct generally involves a willful
act that is undertaken in disregard of the probable harm to others that

41. Infra notes 107-114 and accompanying text.
42. See Carol S. Steiker, Justice vs. Mercy in the Law of Homicide: The Contest
Between Rule-of-Law Values andDiscretionaryLeniency from Common Law to Codication
to Constitution, 47 TEx. TECH L. REv. 1, 2 (2014) ("The common-law categories of murder,
voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter (or rough statutory equivalents with
different appellations) cover most homicides, while modem Anglo-American legislatures
today maintain separate statutory treatment for only a few special categories of homicide such
as vehicular homicide and euthanasia.").
43. Commonwealth v. Pagan, 31 N.E.3d 575, 583 (Mass. 2015).
44. See Commonwealth v. Levesque, 766 N.E.2d 50, 55 (Mass. 2002) ("Because
Massachusetts has not defined manslaughter by statute, its elements are derived from the
common law.").
45. Commonwealth v. Vanderpool, 328 N.E.2d 833, 836 (Mass. 1975).
46. Commonwealth v. Earle, 937 N.E.2d 42,48 (Mass. 2010).
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may result. 4 7 Put slightly differently, wanton or reckless conduct
means intentional conduct that "involves a high degree of likelihood
that substantial harm will result to another."'
Whether actions are wanton or reckless is "determined based
either on the defendant's specific knowledge or on what a reasonable
9
of
person should have known in the circumstances."'4 The first facet
this disjunctive test is subjective, focusing on the defendant's state of
mind, while the second facet is an objective measure, focusing on what
"a reasonable person in the defendant's circumstances would have
perceived.""o In other words, "a defendant's subjective awareness of
the reckless nature of his conduct is sufficient, but not necessary, to
convict him of involuntary manslaughter. Conduct which a reasonable
person, in similar circumstances, would recognize as reckless will
suffice as well.""1 Failing to act where such a duty exists may also be
52
wanton or reckless conduct.
Second-and importantly for purposes of this Article-"reckless
conduct does not require that the actor intend the specific result of his
5
or her conduct, but only that he or she intended to do the reckless act.",
This is important because, as the next subpart illustrates, the U.S.
Supreme Court's test for incitement to unlawful action adopted in
Brandenburg demands proof that a speaker intended the resulting
conduct to occur before her speech falls outside of First Amendment
protection.54
In brief, there is a disconnect on intent between Massachusetts's
law and the First Amendment. Under Massachusetts's definition of
5
involuntary manslaughter, intent for the result to occur is not required.
The U.S. Supreme Court's definition of incitement, however, requires

Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 926 N.E.2d 206,211 (Mass. 2010).
47.
Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910 (Mass. 1944).
48.
Commonwealth v. Pugh, 969 N.E.2d 672, 685 (Mass. 2012) (emphasis added).
49.
Commonwealth v. Moore, 82 N.E.3d 1043, 1049 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015).
50.
Commonwealth v. Catalina, 556 N.E.2d 973, 979 (Mass. 1990).
51.
See Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609, 613 (Mass. 1993) ("A charge
52.
of involuntary manslaughter based on an omission to act can be proved only if the defendant
had a duty to act and did not do so."); Welansky, 55 N.E.2d at 910 ("The essence of wanton or
reckless conduct is intentional conduct, by way either of commission or of omission where
there is a duty to act, which conduct involves a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm
will result to another." (emphasis added)).
Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 926 N.E.2d 206, 211 (Mass. 2010)
53.
(emphasis added).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,448-49 (1969).
54.
Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559, 569 (Mass. 2019).
55.
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an intent to bring about a specific result for the speech to be
unprotected.5 6
Adding a Brandenburglayer of First Amendment defense in cases
such as Carter,as this Article calls for in Part I11, thus has the practical
effect of transforming involuntary manslaughter into a specific intent
crime. In other words, by incorporating Brandenburg into the
equation, Michelle Carter must have both intended to make the
statements that she communicated to Conrad Roy (the only intent
requirement for involuntary manslaughter) and intended them to bring
about the harmful consequence of Conrad Roy committing suicide.
More succinctly, the court could convict Carter only if she intended to
make the statements and only if she made them with the purpose of
having Roy kill himself.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, however, did not
consider this proposed and additional constitutional hurdle in
Commonwealth v. Carter. It only considered if the statements Michelle
Carter intended to make (and, in fact, did make) were wanton or
reckless. The court concluded there was "no doubt ...

that the

defendant wantonly or recklessly instructed the victim to kill himself,
and that her instructions caused his death."" Significantly, it reasoned
that wanton or reckless conduct included not only physicalconduct but
also "verbal conduct," 59 thereby blurring in criminal law what is a
traditional dichotomy in First Amendment jurisprudence between
speech and conduct.60 In affirming the juvenile court judge's

56. Nwanguma v. Trump, 903 F.3d 604, 609 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Bible Believers v.
Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228, 246 (6th Cir. 2015)).
57. Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, PunishingHatredand Prejudice, 56 STAN.
L. REv. 1081, 1121 (2004) ("A specific intent crime is a crime that requires a defendant to do
a prohibited action with some further purpose (beyond the purpose to do the prohibited act)."
(emphasis omitted)); Eric A. Johnson, Rethinking the Presumption of Mens Rea, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 769, 791 (2012) (observing that courts typically define a general-intent crime
as one that "requires the government to prove only that 'the defendant intended to do the
proscribed act,"' while a specific-intent crime is one that "requires the government to prove
that the defendant also intended to 'achieve some additional consequence"' (quoting People v.
Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 378 (Cal. 1969))).
58.
Carter, 115 N.E.3d at 569.
59. Id. at 570 (emphasis added).
60. See generally Diahann DaSilva, Playing a "Labeling Game": Classifying
Expression as Conduct as a Means of CircumventingFirst Amendment Analysis, 56 B.C. L.
REv. 767, 769-70 (2015) (observing "the speech versus conduct dichotomy," and analyzing
"the distinction between speech and conduct, the implications of that distinction, and how
courts have classified various activities as speech or conduct"); Paul Sherman, Occupational
Speech and the FirstAmendment, 128 HARV. L. REv. F. 183, 188 (2015) ("The notion that
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determination that Michelle Carter acted wantonly and recklessly, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reasoned:
[T]he judge expressly tracked the elements of manslaughter. He found:
"She instructs [the victim] to get back into the truck, well knowing of all
of the feelings that he has exchanged with her-his ambiguities, his fears,
his concerns." This, the judge found, constituted "wanton and reckless
conduct by [the defendant], creating a situation where there is a high
degree of likelihood that substantial harm would result to [the victim]."'

In brief, the judge focused on the final moments before Conrad
Roy killed himself and, in particular, the knowledge that Michelle
Carter had at that time about Roy's mental state, his physical state, his
location, and the toxic air inside the truck.62 It was Carter's knowledge
about those circumstances, coupled both with her instructions for Roy
to get back in his truck and her failure to take any steps to stop him
once inside, that the judge determined tantamount to wanton or reckless
+

conduct.63 The formula, as it were, was the following: knowledge
instructions+ failure to act = wanton or reckless conduct.

Proving intent to cause harm thus was not an issue for involuntary
manslaughter; all that mattered was Carter's "wanton or reckless
64
pressuring of a vulnerable person to commit suicide." As the next
subpart illustrates, however, the First Amendment incitement test
requires proof of intent when an individual advocates that another
person commit an unlawful act.

there is a distinction between laws that regulate speech and laws that regulate conduct with
merely an incidental effect on speech is well established.").
Carter, 115 N.E.3d at 567 (quoting Judge Lawrence Moniz, FOX 10 Phoenix,
61.
MUST WATCH Judge Finds Michelle Carter GUILTY in Texting Suicide Case in
Massachusetts, YouTUBE (June 16,2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?-lwkyxXeOCOk).
62. Id. at 565.
The court explained:
63.
The judge found that when the defendant realized he had gotten out of the truck, she
instructed him to get back in, knowing that it had become a toxic environment and
knowing the victim's fears, doubts, and fragile mental state. The victim followed
that instruction. Thereafter, the defendant, knowing the victim was inside the truck
and that the water pump was operating-the judge noted that she could hear the
sound of the pump and the victim's coughing-took no steps to save him. She did
not call emergency personnel, contact the victim's family, or instruct him to get out
of the truck. The victim remained in the truck and succumbed to the carbon
monoxide. The judge concluded that the defendants actions and herfailure to act
constituted, "each and all, " wanton and reckless conduct that caused the victim's
death.
Id. (emphasis added) (internal footnote omitted) (quoting Moniz, supra note 61).
64. Id at 572.
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Incitement and the FirstAmendment

In Brandenburgv. Ohio," the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
First Amendment does "not permit a State to forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action." 66 The three core elements
of this test are the following: (1) intent, (2) imminence, and
(3) likelihood.67
The Brandenburg test, as Professor Margot Kaminski notes,
resolved-at least for now-the Court's long struggle to address
"whether and how to protect speech that calls to action."68 It replaced
the Court's clear-and-present-danger standard6 9 developed in Schenck
v. UnitedStates. 70
Brandenburg, as Part III argues, thus should be relevant in cases
such as Commonwealth v. Carterwhere the defendant's speech urges
another person to commit an act and either:
*
*

when the resulting act committed by that other person is unlawful
or
when a court engages in the legal fiction that words urging action
that another person follows to completion are themselves the
speaker's own crime (that Michelle Carter committed
involuntary manslaughter with her words, not deeds).

65. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
66. Id. at 447.
67. Rodney A. Smolla, Should the Brandenburg v. Ohio Incitement Test Apply in
Media Violence Tort Cases?, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 10 (2000) (asserting that the Brandenburg
test appears "to contain three constituent elements: (1) intent (embodied in the requirement that
such speech to be 'directed to inciting or producing' lawless action); (2) imminence (embodied
in the phrase 'imminent lawless action'); and (3) likelihood (embodied in the phrase 'and is
likely to incite or produce such action')" (quoting Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 447)).
68.
Margot Kaminski, Incitement to Riot in the Age ofFlash Mobs, 81 U. CIN. L. REv.
1,40 (2012).
69.
See Susan M. Gilles, Brandenburg v. State of Ohio: An "Accidental, " "Too Easy,"
and "Incomplete" Landmark Case, 38 CAP. U. L. REv. 517, 520 (2010) ("Brandenburg is
famous for abandoning the 'clear and present danger' test.").
70.
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). In Schenck, the Court held that whether the First
Amendment protects speech urging unlawful action depends on "whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Id.
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Because suicide itself is lawful, though not permitted, in the
United States, the first facet (the one confined to a literal reading of
Brandenburg's"lawless action"7 2 requirement) does not apply in a case
such as Commonwealth v. Carter. The second facet, in contrast,
represents an expansion of Brandenburgthat would sweep up Carter.
In other words, Brandenburg's three-factor test (intent,
imminence, and likelihood) should be expanded and applied where
speech urges others to commit acts that are unlawful, as well as in cases
where conduct-urgingspeech is itselfdeemedcriminalbecause another
person followed it. Adding this second facet, as Part Ed argues, is
important because it incorporates a layer of First Amendment
protection into criminal cases hinging on conduct-urging speech such
as Carter. This addition would be similar to the way that the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that a veneer of First Amendment safety is
essential to add in some instances in tort law when speech allegedly
73
causes reputational harm or emotional distress. In fact, the Court
extended the actual malice standard that applies in such tort cases as a

71. See Kent Greenawalt, Objections in Conscience to Medical Procedures:Does
Religion Make a Diference?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 799, 804 n.23 ("[S]uicide is no longer a
crime....").
72. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
73. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted the actual malice standard to
provide First Amendment protection in libel cases where the plaintiff is a public official or
public figure and in intentional infliction of emotional distress cases where the plaintiff is a
public official or public figure suing over speech. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (involving a lawsuit for intentional infliction of emotional distress based
upon offensive speech in a parody of a magazine advertisement, and concluding that "public
figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue without showing in addition that
the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with 'actual malice"'); Curtis
Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155-56 (1967) (extending the actual malice standard to libel
cases brought by public figures); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)
(concluding that the First Amendment requires "a federal rule that prohibits a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'). Additionally, the court has held that
if a private person sues for intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon speech, the
defendant has protection against tort liability if the speech is about a matter of public concern.
See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451, 460 (2011) (reasoning that "[w]hether the First
Amendment prohibits holding [defendant] Westboro [Baptist Church] liable for its speech in
this case turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private concern, as determined by
all the circumstances of the case," and concluding that the defendant's speech was protected
from tort liability because it "addressed matters of public import on public property, in a
peaceful manner, in full compliance with the guidance of local officials").
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First Amendment shield to apply to criminal law in criminal libel
cases. 7 4
Before turning to that argument in detail in the next Part, however,
it is critical to understand that Brandenburg requires that speech be
"intended to produce" 75 unlawful action before it falls outside of First
Amendment protection.7 ' As the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted
Brandenburgfour years later in Hess v. Indiana,there must be evidence
that the speaker's words "were intended to produce, and likely to
produce, imminent disorder" before a state may permissibly punish the
speaker. Put slightly differently, the message must be "intended by the
speaker to instigate" such action. Or, as Professor Steven Gey
encapsulated it in 2010, Brandenburg "allows the government to
prosecute only those who intend through their expression to cause
harm.""
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reaffirmed this intent requirement in 2018 in Nwanguma v. Trump." It
considered in Nwanguma whether Donald J. Trump's words at a
presidential campaign rally in 2016 that allegedly triggered an assault
on several protestors constituted an unlawful incitement under
82
Brandenburg.
In concluding that Trump's speech was protected by
the First Amendment, the Sixth Circuit observed: "The Brandenburg
test precludes speech from being sanctioned as incitement to riot

74. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) ("The reasons which led us so to
hold in New York Times . . apply with no less force merely because the remedy is criminal.
The constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression compel application of the same
standard to the criminal remedy." (internal citation omitted)).
75. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973).
76. See Michael Vitiello, The Nuremberg Files: Testing the OuterLimits of the First
Amendment, 61 Om1o ST. L.J. 1175, 1217 (2000) ("[A] state must prove the speaker's intent to
bring about the harm; the Court will read ambiguous evidence of the speaker's intent in favor
of the speaker. The Court requires intent, not mere knowledge, that the harm will occur.").
77. Hess, 414 U.S. at 109 (emphasis omitted).
78. Steven G. Gey, The NurembergFiles and the FirstAmendment Value of Threats,
78 TEx. L. REV. 541, 547 (2000).
79. See Robert Firester & Kendall T. Jones, Catchin' the Heat of the Beat: First
Amendment Analysis ofMusic Claimedto Incite Violent Behavior, 20 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REV.
1, 7-8 (2000) ("[Brandenburg]require[s] some showing of intent, whether explicit or implicit,
in conjunction with the other requirements of the test in order to justify revocation of First
Amendment protection.").
80.
Steven G. Gey, The Brandenburg Paradigmand Other FirstAmendments, 12 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 971, 977-78 (2010).
81. 903 F.3d 604, 609 (6th Cir. 2018).
82. See id. at 607-09.
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unless .. . the speaker intends that his speech will result in the use of

-

violence or lawless action. . . ."83
Thus, had a Brandenburg analysis been undertaken in
Commonwealth v. Carter to give Michelle Carter a layer of possible
First Amendment protection from criminal punishment, Massachusetts
would have needed to prove that she actually intended for Conrad Roy
to kill himself. A finding that she merely acted recklessly or
4
wantonly-all that is necessary for involuntary manslaughter
would have been insufficient. This next Part argues that such a First
Amendment-based Brandenburg buffer is important in involuntary
manslaughter cases based on speech urging suicide.
III. A CLOSER LOOK AT COMMONWEALTH V. CARTER AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS: WHY BRANDENBURG IS
IMPORTANT

As explained in the Introduction," the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court did not consider Brandenburgv. Ohio and, instead, only
applied the U.S. Supreme Court's standard from Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co. to determine if the First Amendment provided
Michelle Carter with any defense.8 6 That is troublesome because
Giboney's integral-to-criminal-conduct test, also described earlier,"
offers no additional layer of First Amendment protection at all in cases
such as Commonwealth v. Carter.This poorly defined standard" holds
merely that if speech is integral to criminal conduct, then it receives no
constitutional protection. In brief, if the defendant's words are, as the
Giboney Court put it, "an essential and inseparable part of a grave
offense," 89 then the First Amendment is no longer relevant.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that Giboney
applied in Carter.90 First, it reasoned that the criminal conduct at issue
was involuntary manslaughter.9 1 Second, Michelle Carter's words were
83. Id. at 609 (emphasis added) (quoting Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228,
246 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc)).
84. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (addressing the wanton-or-reckless
conduct element).
See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
85.
See discussion supraPart I.
86.
See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
87.
88. See supranotes 32-34 and accompanying text.
89. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).
Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559, 570-71 (Mass. 2019).
90.
91. See id. at 570 ("The crime of involuntary manslaughterproscribes reckless or
wanton conduct causing the death of another." (emphasis added)).
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integral to that criminal conduct because they were uttered wantonly
and recklessly-an essential element of involuntary manslaughter 92
and because they triggered a person's death, another essential
ingredient of involuntary manslaughter,9 3 thereby extinguishing any
First Amendment concerns.94 In other words, if a court identifies a
particular crime-here, involuntary manslaughter-and the speech at
issue satisfies integral elements of that crime, then free expression
concerns evaporate.
Brandenburg, in contrast, would have forced the prosecution to
clear three different hurdles in additionto the elements of involuntary
manslaughter before discharging First Amendment concerns from the
criminal equation. Specifically, and as applied to Michelle Carter's
case, it would have required the prosecution to prove that (1) Michelle
Carter intended for Conrad Roy to take his own life; (2) the time
between Carter's words and Roy's suicide was very short
(Brandenburg'simminence prong); and (3) it was likely Roy would, in
fact, commit suicide after hearing Carter's words (Brandenburg's
likelihood prong). This is not, by any means, an absolute First
Amendment defense. It may well have been that the prosecution could
have satisfied all three elements in Michelle Carter's case. However,
unlike Giboney, Brandenburgat least mandates that the government
satisfy a trio of clear and distinct elements before removing First
Amendment concerns from the prosecutorial table.95
Why is it important to apply the Brandenburg test as a First
Amendment layer of protection in involuntary manslaughter cases like
92.
See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text (addressing the wanton-or-reckless
conduct element).
93.
See Carter, 115 N.E.3d at 569 ("It has long been established in our common law
that wanton or reckless conduct that causes a person 's death constitutes involuntary

manslaughter." (emphasis added)).
94. Summing up this line of analysis, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
reasoned that:
The only verbal conduct punished as involuntary manslaughter has been the wanton
or reckless pressuring of a vulnerable person to commit suicide, overpowering that
person's will to live and resulting in that person's death. We are therefore not
punishing words alone, as the defendant claims, but reckless or wanton words
causing death. The speech at issue is thus integral to a course of criminal conduct
and thus does not raise any constitutional problem.

Id at 572.
95.
Compare Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969), andRodney A. Smolla,
Should the Brandenburg v. Ohio Incitement Test Apply in Media Violence Tort Cases?, 27 N.

Ky. L. REv. 1, 10 (2000), with Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498, 502
(1949).
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Carter?The answer is that if a court is going to engage in the twin
96
fictions that a person's words constitute conduct and that they are so
powerful and tremendously forceful as to actually cause a death, as the
97
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court believed, then it must balance
out such assumptions about the lethal power of speech with First
Amendment safeguards. Those assumptions about speech are akin to
the outdated hypodermic needle or bullet theory of powerful effects of
media messages on audience members."
Ironically, Massachusetts's highest court readily acknowledged in
Carter "that legal causation in the context of suicide is an incredibly
Others have also noted the complexity of
complex inquiry. "
establishing causation in suicide cases like Carter." Countering
conclusions about causation with a First Amendment intent
requirement like that in Brandenburgthus provides a necessary balance
on the defendant's behalf.
The decision in Carterthat words can kill represents, as attorney
Matthew Segal of ACLU Massachusetts put it, "a drastic expansion of
criminal law in Massachusetts."'0 Indeed, Robert Cordy, a justice on
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, acknowledged that
Commonwealth v. Carterwas precedent setting as the first case in the
Bay State in which words, standing alone, formed the basis for
involuntary manslaughter.' 02 The decision also vitiates the general legal
principle, as Professor Sharon Beckman explains, "that a person is
responsible for their own suicide. That ... applies no matter what the
other person said or whether they handed them the weapon."103

The court used the phrase "verbal conduct" more than a half-dozen times to refer
96.
to Michelle Carter's words. Carter, 115 N.E.3d at 562-72.
97. See id. at 569 (concluding that Carter's "instructions caused his death").
98. See generally JENNINGS BRYANT & SUSAN THOMPSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MEDIA
EFFECTS 36-37 (2002) (addressing this theory).
99. Carter, 115 N.E.3d at 568.
100. See, e.g., Nicholas LaPalme, Note, Michelle Carter and the Curious Case of
Causation:How to Respond to a Newly Emerging Class of Suicide-RelatedProceedings,98
B.U. L. REV. 1443, 1446 (2018) ("[E]stablishing causation in encouraging suicide cases, such
as Michelle Carter's case, involves a higher degree of complexity that cannot be overlooked.").
101. Seelyc & Bidgood, supranote 9, at All.
102. See Jess Bidgood, Text to TeenagerBefore His Suicide: 'You've Gotta Do It,'N.Y.
TIMEs, June 7, 2017, at A12 ("Robert Cordy, a Supreme Judicial Court justice, acknowledged
that Ms. Carter's case was the first involuntary manslaughter indictment the court had
considered 'on the basis of words alone."' (quoting Commonwealth v. Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054,
1062 (Mass. 2016)).
103. Demick, supranote 11, at A6.
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Caution must accompany such a vast expansion of involuntary
manslaughter from the realm of physical conduct into the domain of
expression, especially because Carterinvolved rarely trodden, if not
completely uncharted, legal territory.10 4 By definition, the case puts into
play concerns about speech, which in turn puts the First Amendment at
issue. Brandenburgprovides a measure of limited protection in these
situations to prevent the needless trampling on First Amendment
speech interests. Its application allows for conviction but requires proof
of an intent-a specific purpose-to cause a suicide (along with proof
of imminence and likelihood of suicide) before such a conviction can
be upheld.
Carterrests on the belief that words actually kill. That simply is
not accurate. As Professor Mary Anne Franks observes, "[Carter's]
words caused great harm, but they didn't kill this young man. He chose
to kill himself . . . ."' Kathleen Parker echoed this sentiment about
Carter's speech in the Washington Post, remarking, "Words do matter,
but they're not lethal."l06 Nevertheless, if courts are to engage in such
fiction, they should at least apply Brandenburg to balance out First
Amendment concerns. In brief, if expanding upon involuntary
manslaughter to punish a defendant whose speech encourages it, then
Brandenburg should apply to allow a possible defense for such
defendants.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The First Amendment may not have protected Michelle Carter's
words, which led to her involuntary manslaughter conviction, even if
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had applied Brandenburg's
incitement standard instead of Giboney's integral-to-criminal-conduct
test. Given Carter's text to a friend, stating that she told Conrad Roy to
get back in his truck after he initially left it,"o' and given indications
104. Professors Guyora Binder and Luis Chiesa explain that:
homicide liability for the suicide of another is rare, and almost always involves some
more tangible contribution to the killing than Carter's. Indeed, we have found no
previous American case where the victim intentionally killed himself and the
defendant was convicted of homicide for verbal encouragement only. Nor have we
found another case of homicide liability where the encourager was never in the
presence of the suicide.
Guyora Binder & Luis Chiesa, The Puzzle of IncitingSuicide, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 65, 66
(2019) (internal footnote omitted).
105. della Cava, supra note 9, at 1A.
106. Kathleen Parker, Can Words Kill?, WASH. POST, June 21, 2017, at Al7.
107. Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559, 565 (Mass. 2019).
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from another text that she did nothing to stop Roy from killing himself
0
once he got back in his truck and she heard him dying,' a reasonable
factfinder, whether a judge or a jury, might come to the conclusion that
Carter intended for Roy to kill himself. The imminence and likelihood
elements of Brandenburgmight also have been met in Commonwealth
v. Carter, given that Carter was talking with Roy immediately before
he died (satisfying imminence) and given Roy's mental state and prior
suicide efforts (perhaps suggesting a likelihood that he would kill
himself).
In future cases, however, proving intent and the other two
Brandenburgelements may not be so seemingly easy or certain. The
line, in turn, between protected advocacy and unprotected incitement
may be blurrier. In fact, the abstract advocacy of suicide merits First
Amendment protection. As the Minnesota Supreme Court wrote in
2014, "Speech in support of suicide, however distasteful, is an
expression of a viewpoint on a matter of public concern, and, given
current U.S. Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence, is
therefore entitled to special protection as the 'highest rung of the
09
hierarchy of First Amendment values."'l
In summary, expanding the scope of Brandenburgbeyond those
situations in which the act urged is unlawful (given that suicide today
is generally considered lawful') to reach cases in which the words
urging conduct themselves become the unlawful act is essential.
Specifically, it is imperative to protect the First Amendment speech
interests of defendants in involuntary manslaughter cases such as
Commonwealth v. Carterwhere a court treats words like conduct and
engages in assumptions about the powerful effects of speech on
individuals.
Such cases, in fact, may become more common. That is because
"suicide is the second-leading cause of death among people between
the ages of 10 and 24""'1 '-Conrad Roy, in fact, was just eighteen years
old when he took his own lifel 2-and bullying is a pervasive behavior
108. Id.
109. State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.w.2d 13, 24 (Minn. 2014) (quoting Snyder v.
Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 444 (2011)).
110.

See Carla Zavala, Comment, Manslaughter by Text: Is Encouraging Suicide

Manslaughter?,47 SETON HALL L. REv. 297, 307 (2016) ("Faced with an inability to punish
the crime, many states decided not to treat suicide as a crime at all when they moved away
from the common law and shifted toward statutory crimes.").

111. Alex B. Long, Abolishing the Suicide Rule, 113 Nw. U. L. REV. 767, 768 (2018).
112. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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among teens.1 13 Furthermore, lawmakers in some states, in reaction to
Michelle Carter's case, are now proposing legislation that would make
it a crime to "encourage" suicide.114 If, and when, such new cases come
down the legal pike, future defendants must be able to mount a
Brandenburgdefense rather than lose all First Amendment protection
under Giboney.

113. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDuc., NCES 2017-015, STUDENT REPORTS OF BULLYING:
RESULTS FROM THE 2015 SCHOOL CRIME SUPPLEMENT TO THE NATIONAL CRIME VIcrlMZATION
SURVEY, at T-1 (2016), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs20l7/2017015.pdf (noting that 20.8% of
students surveyed, who ranged in ages from twelve to eighteen years, reported being bullied at
school during the 2014-15 school year).

114. See H.B. 1625, 92d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2019) (proposing a criminal
defense for "[e]ncouraging the suicide of another person"); see also Bill to Criminalize
Encouraging Suicide Advances in Arkansas Legislature, FOX16.coM (Mar. 14, 2019),
https://www.foxl 6 .com/news/local-news/bill-to-crininalize-encouraging-suicide-advances-

in-arkansas-legislature/1850426129 (noting that the sponsor of the Arkansas bill said that "he
started working on this proposal after reading about the suicide of an

18-year-old

Massachusetts boy. His girlfriend repeatedly encouraged him to go through with a suicide
attempt. She was later convicted of involuntary manslaughter in a highly publicized trial").
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